A Family of Post-Quantum Secure Digital Signature Algorithms
The Picnic family of digital signature algorithms is designed to provide security against attacks by quantum computers, in addition to attacks by classical computers. The building blocks are a zero-knowledge proof system (with post-quantum security), and symmetric key primitives like hash functions and block ciphers, with well-understood post-quantum security. Picnic does not require number-theoretic, or structured hardness assumptions.
- Melissa Chase, David Derler, Steven Goldfeder, Claudio Orlandi, Sebastian Ramacher, Christian Rechberger, Daniel Slamanig, Greg Zaverucha. Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge and Signatures from Symmetric-Key Primitives. ACM CCS 2017 (see also ePrint 2017/279).
- Léo Perrin, Angela Promitzer, Sebastian Ramacher, Christian Rechberger. Improvements to the Linear Layer of LowMC: A Faster Picnic. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 2017/1148
- Jonathan Katz, Vladimir Kolesnikov and Xiao Wang. Improved Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge with Applications to Post-Quantum Signatures. ACM CCS 2018(see also ePrint Report 2018/475
Libraries Implementing Picnic
- Reference Implementation An implementation that tries to be simple, and follow the spec closely, to illustrate the algorithm.
Projects and Demos
- open-quantum-safe/liboqs: liboqs is a C library for quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. It has support for Picnic.
HSM Demo: We have experimented with using Picnic on a commercial hardware security module, as described in the Design Document. The software
is available here.
Flexibility of the Picnic Design
Although not directly related to Picnic, other post-quantum secure (privacy enhancing) primitives use the same building blocks as Picnic. We believe that this work nicely demonstrates the flexibility of the basic Picnic design, which is why we list the respective papers below.
- Dan Boneh, Saba Eskandarian, Ben Fisch. Post-Quantum Group Signatures from Symmetric Primitives. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 2018/261.
- David Derler, Sebastian Ramacher, Daniel Slamanig. Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Accumulators with Applications to Ring Signatures from Symmetric-Key Primitives. PQCrypto 2018.
Picnic was designed by a group of cryptographers from Aarhus University, AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH, DFINITY, Graz University of Technology, Georgia Tech, Microsoft Research, Northwestern University, Princeton University, Technical University of Denmark and the University of Maryland. The team includes Melissa Chase, David Derler, Steven Goldfeder, Jonathan Katz, Vladimir Kolesnikov, Claudio Orlandi, Sebastian Ramacher, Christian Rechberger, Daniel Slamanig, Xiao Wang, and Greg Zaverucha.