A Family of Post-Quantum Secure Digital Signature Algorithms
The Picnic family of digital signature algorithms is designed to provide security against attacks by quantum computers, in addition to attacks by classical computers. The building blocks are a zero-knowledge proof system (with post-quantum security), and symmetric key primitives like hash functions and block ciphers, with well-understood post-quantum security. Picnic does not require number-theoretic, or structured hardness assumptions.
- Melissa Chase, David Derler, Steven Goldfeder, Claudio Orlandi, Sebastian Ramacher, Christian Rechberger, Daniel Slamanig, Greg Zaverucha. Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge and Signatures from Symmetric-Key Primitives. ACM CCS 2017 (see also ePrint 2017/279).
- Léo Perrin and Angela Promitzer and Sebastian Ramacher and Christian Rechberger. Improvements to the Linear Layer of LowMC: A Faster Picnic. Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/1148
Libraries Implementing Picnic
- Reference Implementation An implementation that tries to be simple, and follow the spec closely, to illustrate the algorithm.
Projects and Demos
- open-quantum-safe/liboqs: liboqs is a C library for quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. It has
support for Picnic.
HSM Demo: We have experimented with using Picnic on a commercial hardware security module, as described in the Design Document. The software
is available here.
Picnic was designed by a group of cryptographers from Aarhus University, AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH, Graz University of Technology, Microsoft Research, Princeton University, and Technical University of Denmark. The team includes Melissa Chase, David Derler, Steven Goldfeder, Claudio Orlandi, Sebastian Ramacher, Christian Rechberger, Daniel Slamanig, and Greg Zaverucha.