In this article
{{Skill}} Skill Security Model
{{One-paragraph intro: name the runtime files, the trust-bucket decomposition, and state "Each bucket enumerates all six STRIDE categories with the in-code mitigations that address them."}}
See also: repo-wide STRIDE model. This skill participates in the repository-wide threat model recorded in
docs/security/security-model.mdand is registered in its Skill Security Models section. In the copiedSECURITY.md, link to the repo model with a relative path such as../../../../docs/security/security-model.md.
Executive Summary
{{2-4 sentences: what the skill does, its highest-risk behavior, and the overall residual-risk posture.}}
Security Posture Overview
| Dimension | Value |
|---|---|
| Runtime surface | {{e.g., REST CLI; environment credentials; subprocess}} |
| Trust buckets | {{count and one-line list, e.g., B1 CLI→API, B2 credentials, B3 caller}} |
| Credentials | {{what secrets are handled and how}} |
| Network egress | {{endpoints reached, transport}} |
| Open residual gaps | {{count}} ({{highest severity}}) |
Contents
- System Description
- Trust Boundaries
- Assets
- Adversaries
- Bucket B1: {{name}}
- Enterprise Readiness Gaps
- References
System Description
Components
- {{runtime file}} — {{role}}
- {{runtime file}} — {{role}}
Data Flow
flowchart TD
subgraph HOST["Operator Workstation / Runner (trust zone)"]
CLI["{{skill}} CLI"]
Credentials["Credentials<br/>(env / token store)"]
OUT["Output files"]
end
subgraph EXT["External Service / Tool (network boundary)"]
API["{{external API or tool}}"]
end
CLI -->|"reads"| Credentials
CLI -->|"request (HTTPS/TLS)"| API
API -->|"response (untrusted)"| CLI
CLI -->|"writes"| OUT
Trust Boundaries
Boundary Diagram
┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ TRUST BOUNDARY: Operator Workstation / Runner │
│ ┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ │
│ │ {{skill}} │ │ Credentials │ │ Output files │ │
│ │ CLI │ │ (env/store) │ │ │ │
│ └─────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │
└───────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────┘
│ TLS
┌────────────────────▼────────────────────┐
│ TRUST BOUNDARY: External Service / Tool │
│ ┌────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ {{external API or tool}} │ │
│ └────────────────────────────────────┘ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
Boundary Descriptions
| Boundary | Assets Protected | Controls Enforced |
|---|---|---|
| {{Workstation/Runner}} | {{credentials, outputs}} | {{env handling, file perms}} |
| {{External Service}} | {{request/response integrity}} | {{TLS, no-redirect opener, response caps}} |
Assets
| Id | Asset | Lifetime | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | {{asset}} | {{lifetime}} | {{notes}} |
Adversaries
| Id | Adversary | In-scope mitigations |
|---|---|---|
| ADV-a | {{adversary}} | {{mitigations}} |
Bucket B1: {{name}}
Spoofing
- {{mitigation}}
Tampering
- {{mitigation}}
Repudiation
- {{mitigation, or "Not applicable.
."}}
Information Disclosure
- {{mitigation}}
Denial of Service
- {{mitigation}}
Elevation of Privilege
- {{mitigation}}
Risk Rating
| Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Residual Risk | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| {{threat}} | {{Low/Med/High}} | {{Low/Med/High}} | {{Low/Med/High}} | {{Mitigated / Partially Mitigated / Accepted}} |
Enterprise Readiness Gaps
The following are known limitations recorded so operators can make informed deployment decisions. Severity ratings are the project's own assessment and are not equivalent to a CVSS score.
| Id | Gap | Severity | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| G-{{CAT}}-1 | {{gap}} | {{Category-Level, e.g., InfoDisc-Med}} | {{disposition}} |
For an active issue tracker entry covering these gaps, see the hve-core issues list.
References
- STRIDE Threat Model
- {{relevant OWASP list, e.g., OWASP Top 10 / LLM Top 10}}
- {{the skill's external API/tool security docs}}
- Repository security model —
docs/security/security-model.md
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