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{{Skill}} Skill Security Model

{{One-paragraph intro: name the runtime files, the trust-bucket decomposition, and state "Each bucket enumerates all six STRIDE categories with the in-code mitigations that address them."}}

See also: repo-wide STRIDE model. This skill participates in the repository-wide threat model recorded in docs/security/security-model.md and is registered in its Skill Security Models section. In the copied SECURITY.md, link to the repo model with a relative path such as ../../../../docs/security/security-model.md.

Executive Summary

{{2-4 sentences: what the skill does, its highest-risk behavior, and the overall residual-risk posture.}}

Security Posture Overview

DimensionValue
Runtime surface{{e.g., REST CLI; environment credentials; subprocess}}
Trust buckets{{count and one-line list, e.g., B1 CLI→API, B2 credentials, B3 caller}}
Credentials{{what secrets are handled and how}}
Network egress{{endpoints reached, transport}}
Open residual gaps{{count}} ({{highest severity}})

Contents

System Description

Components

  1. {{runtime file}} — {{role}}
  2. {{runtime file}} — {{role}}

Data Flow

flowchart TD
subgraph HOST["Operator Workstation / Runner (trust zone)"]
CLI["{{skill}} CLI"]
Credentials["Credentials<br/>(env / token store)"]
OUT["Output files"]
end
subgraph EXT["External Service / Tool (network boundary)"]
API["{{external API or tool}}"]
end
CLI -->|"reads"| Credentials
CLI -->|"request (HTTPS/TLS)"| API
API -->|"response (untrusted)"| CLI
CLI -->|"writes"| OUT

Trust Boundaries

Boundary Diagram

┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ TRUST BOUNDARY: Operator Workstation / Runner │
│ ┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ │
│ │ {{skill}} │ │ Credentials │ │ Output files │ │
│ │ CLI │ │ (env/store) │ │ │ │
│ └─────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │
└───────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────┘
│ TLS
┌────────────────────▼────────────────────┐
│ TRUST BOUNDARY: External Service / Tool │
│ ┌────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ {{external API or tool}} │ │
│ └────────────────────────────────────┘ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘

Boundary Descriptions

BoundaryAssets ProtectedControls Enforced
{{Workstation/Runner}}{{credentials, outputs}}{{env handling, file perms}}
{{External Service}}{{request/response integrity}}{{TLS, no-redirect opener, response caps}}

Assets

IdAssetLifetimeNotes
A1{{asset}}{{lifetime}}{{notes}}

Adversaries

IdAdversaryIn-scope mitigations
ADV-a{{adversary}}{{mitigations}}

Bucket B1: {{name}}

Spoofing

  • {{mitigation}}

Tampering

  • {{mitigation}}

Repudiation

  • {{mitigation, or "Not applicable. ."}}

Information Disclosure

  • {{mitigation}}

Denial of Service

  • {{mitigation}}

Elevation of Privilege

  • {{mitigation}}

Risk Rating

ThreatLikelihoodImpactResidual RiskStatus
{{threat}}{{Low/Med/High}}{{Low/Med/High}}{{Low/Med/High}}{{Mitigated / Partially Mitigated / Accepted}}

Enterprise Readiness Gaps

The following are known limitations recorded so operators can make informed deployment decisions. Severity ratings are the project's own assessment and are not equivalent to a CVSS score.

IdGapSeverityStatus
G-{{CAT}}-1{{gap}}{{Category-Level, e.g., InfoDisc-Med}}{{disposition}}

For an active issue tracker entry covering these gaps, see the hve-core issues list.

References

  • STRIDE Threat Model
  • {{relevant OWASP list, e.g., OWASP Top 10 / LLM Top 10}}
  • {{the skill's external API/tool security docs}}
  • Repository security model — docs/security/security-model.md

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