Event data capture
Info
ID: MS-TA7026
Tactic: Collection
MITRE technique: T1213
Cloud applications often generate logs that include diagnostic data, request metadata, or user input. Due to misconfigured logging levels or insufficient filtering, these logs may inadvertently contain sensitive information such as credentials and PII, or details about the application environment — such as internal paths, dependency versions or cloud resource names, which could assist adversaries in furthering their attacks. Logs may be stored locally, streamed to external services, or accessed via debugging interfaces. If an attacker gains access to the application or its logging infrastructure, they can collect this data to aid further exploitation or reconnaissance.
For example, AWS Lambda functions automatically send all standard output to CloudWatch Logs. If verbose or debug-level logging is misconfigured and left enabled in production, sensitive data may end up in the log group. An attacker who gains read access to CloudWatch can then harvest this information.
Mitigations
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| MS-M7017 | Implement least-privilege access | Restrict permissions to read logs and diagnostic data to only authorized users and roles. |
| MS-M7011 | Disable basic authentication | Turn off basic authentication for log streaming endpoints and diagnostic interfaces. |
| MS-M7039 | Avoid logging sensitive data | Configure logging filters to exclude passwords, API keys, tokens, and PII from application logs. |